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Recent decades have witnessed the emergence of transnational business gover-
nance schemes that regulate business conduct by involving ‘a significant degree of
non-state authority in the performance of regulatory functions across national
borders’.1 In such schemes, the authority does not emanate from state or inter-
government institutions, but from ‘an array of private sector, civil society, multi-
stakeholder and hybrid public-private institutions.’2 A variety of transnational
business governance schemes exist across sectors and industries, including
organic food, coffee and tea production, tourism, forestry, fishery, aquaculture,
palm oil production, and apparel production. Among these, the forest governance
scheme has attracted intensive academic attention concerning its emergence and
development, impact, constraints, and potential solutions.3
Two important forms of forest governance schemes currently exist: the widely
applied certification schemes and the newly emerging legality schemes. The forest
certification scheme is a private governance instrument, which requires an
accredited, independent third-party certifier to evaluate and audit the production
processes or methods according to pre-defined environmental and/or social
sustainability standards.4 In the certification regime, standards are defined by a
governing body independently of the government, and audits are conducted by
private actors. In a legality regime, standards are defined by law, and timber pro-
ducers can usually choose their own measures to verify and guarantee the legality
of their products, usually by means of certification or other third-party verifica-
tion schemes.5
Scholars increasingly realise that states and the certification schemes are inter-
twined. Rather than being bypassed by certification, the state plays an important
role in the agenda setting, implementation, and enforcement stages of forest cer-
tification schemes.6 In the literature, it has been explored how states enable and
* The research is conducted under the umbrella of the project ‘Smart Mixes in relation to
Transboundary Environmental Harm’. I am grateful to Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and
Sciences for supporting the project. I am also grateful to Judith van Erp, Peter Mascini, Paul
Verbruggen and all associated with this special issue for their very useful comments.
1 Eberlein et al. 2014, p. 3.
2 Eberlein et al. 2014, p. 1.
3 See Cashore, Auld & Newsom 2004; Pattberg 2005; Cashore et al. 2006, Gulbrandsen 2010; Bart-
ley 2003.
4 Barry et al. 2012, p. 1.
5 Bartley 2014, p. 97-98.
6 Gulbrandsen 2014.
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influence the certification scheme in various ways without participating directly
in its regulatory process, such as acting as the legitimiser, the public monitor, or
the buyer of timber products.7 The state can also participate directly in the regu-
latory process of industry-dominated certification schemes: for example, by par-
ticipating in the negotiation of standards and by accrediting the certifiers.8 The
extent of direct state participation may vary between jurisdictions;9 however,
apart from the state's involvement in accreditation, most of these roles are not
based on its authoritative position.
The majority of these studies on forest governance focus on developed countries,
where the space for private standards and auditors is relatively unconstrained,
and forest certification schemes are well institutionalised. The role of the govern-
ment in emerging economies and developing countries, where forest certification
still plays a modest role or is yet to be institutionalized, has only begun recently
to attract academic attention. For example, Buckingham and Jepson argue that in
China, instead of enabling and influencing the certification scheme, the govern-
ment leads the initiation and operation process of forest certification.10 However,
research into the role of the state in forest certification in emerging economies
and developing countries is still sparse. Whether the state functions in a way sim-
ilar to that of developed countries remains to be explored.
A phenomenon that may complicate the already complex picture is the emerging
legality requirement. Developed countries are increasingly concerned about the
legality of timber products imported from emerging economies and developing
countries where the risk of illegal logging is high. Therefore, they require a verifi-
cation of the legality of imported products, usually by third parties.11 Some argue
that the legality verification will promote the application of certification, espe-
cially in developing countries.12 Others, however, regard it as a sign of the govern-
ment's increasingly centred role.13 How the emerging legality requirement will
influence certification and the role of government in emerging economies in for-
est governance is still under debate.
This paper explores the role of the government in the transnational forest gover-
nance schemes, based on a review of the existing literature. The general indirect
role of governments in certification schemes in developed countries – including
both the FSC scheme and the industry-dominated schemes – has been summar-
ised by Gulbrandsen.14 However, country studies are still needed to understand
how governments participate directly in the regulatory processes of industry-
dominated schemes. Unlike the FSC, which is a global scheme, industry-domina-
ted schemes are usually established at the national level, and are context based.
This paper examines the roles of governments in industry-dominated schemes in
7 Overdevest 2010; Gulbransen 2014; Hysing 2009; Boström 2003.
8 Cadman 2011, p. 121.
9 Gale & Haward 2011.
10 Buckingham & Jepson 2013.
11 Overdevest & Zeitlin 2013.
12 Cashore & Stone 2012, 2014; Overdevest & Zeitlin 2014.
13 Bartley 2014.
14 Gulbrandsen 2014.
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developed and emerging economies, respectively, with special attention given to
the latter, where the existing literature is scanty. Some emerging economies are
establishing their own legality regimes, and the roles that governments play in
these are also analysed.
After this introduction (1), Section 2 briefly introduces the development of trans-
national forest governance (2). Section 3 summarises the traditional view con-
cerning the roles of government in forest certification. These roles are derived
from the literature regarding the FSC scheme and industry-dominated schemes
(3). In Section 4, country-based studies are used to specify the roles governments
play in industry-dominated schemes in particular developed countries (4). In Sec-
tion 5, the manner in which the government influences certification schemes in
some emerging economies is analysed. The influence of legality requirements on
the role of the government in forest governance is also examined in this
section (5). Section 6 presents the conclusion (6).
2 Transnational forest governance: a brief history
2.1 The Emergence of Forest Certification Schemes
For decades, forest degradation and deforestation in the tropics and other places
have been of serious concern, and the international community has made great
efforts to address this challenge by way of international law. The International
Tropical Timber Agreement (ITTA) was reached, and its implementation organi-
sation, the International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO), was created in the
1980s. The ITTO was found to make too many compromises regarding economic
losses, and was not able to deal effectively with deforestation. This was followed
by a failure to reach a legally binding global forest convention in the 1992 UN
Conference on Environment and Development.15
In addition to the failure to reach consensus at an international level, many coun-
tries found their domestic proposals – such as banning the import of tropical tim-
ber – vulnerable to challenges concerning international trade. Therefore, some of
the governments redirected resources to support the private labeling programme,
the emerging FSC.16
Having made great efforts in embedding forest management standards in inter-
national organizations and in promoting consumers boycott campaigns, environ-
mental groups were also frustrated by the reality.17 The global institutional con-
text dominated by neo-liberal agendas and rules of free trade in the 1990s made
governmental regulation an unsatisfactory solution for global forest problems. In
response, the WWF and other environment NGOs started to engage retailers and
other commercial interests in creating a private certification scheme.18 The For-
est Stewardship Council (FSC) was established during a meeting in 1993, with
130 participants from 26 countries, including representatives from environmen-
15 Gulbrandsen 2010.
16 Bartley 2003.
17 Bartley 2003, p. 444.
18 Gulbrandsen 2010, p. 52.
56 Recht der Werkelijkheid 2014 (35) 3
Dit artikel uit Recht der Werkelijkheid is gepubliceerd door Boom Juridische uitgevers en is bestemd voor Erasmus Universiteit
The government’s roles in transnational forest governance
tal NGOs, social groups, retailers, manufacturers, forest-related companies, and
professional certification bodies.19
The newly created forest certification schemes encountered a variety of responses
in many jurisdictions. Certain countries, such as Sweden, favoured introduction
of the certification scheme from the very beginning,20 while the UK expressed
strong hostility to the FSC in the early 1990s.In Australia, a wait-and-see
approach was adopted. Some countries opted for a prompt response to the emer-
gence of the FSC, by establishing their own industry-dominated certification
schemes, such as the Sustainable Forest Initiative in the US(SFI), Canadian Stan-
dards Association in Canada (CSA), and the Norwegian Living Forests standard.
Many such national certification schemes later become connected through
endorsement by another influential international certification scheme, the Pro-
gramme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification (PEFC).
2.2 The Development of Forest Certification Schemes: Differences between Developed
and Developing Countries
The FSC and the PEFC are by far the largest global forest certification schemes,
and provide coverage to 10% of the global forest area.21 Though tropical defores-
tation was the major impetus behind the initiation of the FSC, most support for
forest certification has occurred in developed countries. By 2014, North America
and Europe possessed most of the certified forests: 83.36% of the total FSC-
certified areas22 and 93% of the total PEFC-certified areas.23 Despite the initial
hesitation or skepticism in some countries, most governments in Western coun-
tries have become supportive of forest certification schemes, along with the
development of forest certification and globalisation of the timber market. For
example, the FSC became dominant in UK because of its excellent reputation in
the market and commitment on the part of British retailors.24 Both the FSC and
industry-dominated programmes have also gained popularity in Canada. Some
provinces, such as Ontario, even mandate certification for major licensees, hoping
to gain market recognition for its forest products.25 Australia also became more
supportive when its export market shifted to the EU and the US after the cur-
rency crisis is Asia.26
The adoption of forest certification in emerging economies and developing coun-
tries, however, is still limited. Many factors constrict the institutionalisation of
certification schemes in those places. For example, for many countries, the major
19 Klooster 2005, p. 406.
20 Hysing 2009.
21 Georgia-Pacific, Forest Certification Around the World, available at: www. gp. com/ ~/ media/
Corporate/ GPCOM/ Files/ Sustainability/ Sustainability -Document -List/ Forest_ Certification_
Around_ the_ World. ashx ?force= 1.
22 FSC, Global FSC Certificates: Type and Distribution, October 2014, available at: https:// ic. fsc. org/
facts -figures. 19. htm.
23 PEFC, Global Statistics: SFM & CoC Certification, available at:PEFC, Global Statistics: SFM & CoC
Certification.
24 Gale & Haward 2011, p. 252-256.
25 Gale & Haward 2011, p. 189-193.
26 Gale & Haward 2011, p. 152-159.
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export market is Asia, which is less environmentally sensitive. Even when coun-
tries export substantially to North America and Europe, exported timber consti-
tutes only a small fraction compared to their domestic consumption.27 Their
dominant forestry-related problems, such as corruption, limited governmental
enforcement capacity, and conflicting tenure rights, cannot be addressed easily by
certification.28
2.3 The Rising Legality Regimes
Although forest certification has gained increasing support in developed coun-
tries, substantial limits are still encountered in their emerging economies. In
many of these countries, forestry problems, such as illegal logging, are still preva-
lent. With the increasing globalisation of the timber trade, developed countries
have come to realise that good forest governance cannot be achieved without
engaging producers of timber products in developing countries. Developing
countries can also increase their revenue by controlling illegal logging.29 These
situations triggered the emergence of the legality regime, which requires that all
timber products entered into the market be in compliance with the law in the
country of harvest. Such a requirement can be found in the EU, the US, and Aus-
tralia.30
The legality requirement provides a stepwise approach to certification, since it
requires only the legal compliance of the timber products, and not the high stan-
dards of sustainability under certification schemes.31 Given the similarity of the
legality requirements in the EU, the US and Australia, this paper uses the EU
scheme to show how a legality regime may function and influence forest gover-
nance in exporting countries.
The Forest Law Enforcement, Governance, and Trade Action Plan (FLEGT) was
launched in the EU in 2003, and aims at controlling illegal logging, especially the
import of illegally logged timber into the EU market.32 Since 'the highest levels of
illegal logging are found in developing and emerging market countries', the
FLEGT mainly targets and influences these countries.33 The promotion of trade in
legal timber, through developing Voluntary Partnership Agreements (VPAs) and a
timber licensing system, is at the core of the FLEGT.34 A VPA is a voluntary agree-
ment signed between the EU and a timber- exporting country, which establishes a
legality assurance system (LAS) to ensure that all timber products exported to the
EU are in compliance with the law of the exporting countries.35 The LAS identi-
fies, monitors and licenses legally produced timber. Given the limited enforce-
ment capacity and the serious corruption phenomena in VPA partner countries,
27 Gulbrandsen 2010, p. 78-79.
28 Cashore et al. 2006, p. 566-577.
29 Wiersum et al. 2013, p. 2.
30 Smith, Murillo & Anderson 2013, p. 49-50.
31 Cashore & Stone 2014.
32 Brack 2005, p. 32.
33 FLEGT Action Plan, Section 4.1.
34 Helden 2012, p. 99; Brack 2005, p. 33.
35 www. euflegt. efi. int/ what -is -vpa.
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the EU lacks confidence in existing public regulation concerning illegal logging,
and considers the principle of independent verification by third parties to be
extremely important.36
The EU Timber Regulation – another significant part of the FLEGT – was intro-
duced in 2013, and prohibits the production and import of illegal timber prod-
ucts. According to the EU Timber Regulation, operators 'who place timber and
timber products on the internal market for the first time' shall exercise 'due dili-
gence' to ensure their products are legal.37 The licenses obtained according to LAS
under the VPAs and certifications granted according to the CITEs (Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora) are accepted
as an indication of 'due diligence'. In addition to that, the EU Timber Regulation
does not specify which instruments are to be regarded as satisfying the due dili-
gence requirement. Operators can choose their own specific measures.
The EU Timber Regulation, however, does prescribe a few requirements with
regard to the due diligence system, including a risk assessment procedure. The
origin of timber products is an important criterion to assess risks.38 Therefore,
though the due diligence obligation applies to both domestic products and all
imported products, 'it is not difficult to imagine that timber harvested in Europe
might in practice receive less scrutiny than imported timber, particularly if the
latter originates in areas with high levels of illegal logging'.39 Most of the high-
risk countries are emerging economies and developing countries. This paper,
therefore, discusses only the influence of the legality regime on emerging econo-
mies/developing countries, but not on developed countries. Public regulation in
the former countries is usually not accepted as sufficient proof of legality, and
verification by independent third parties is regarded as an important comple-
ment. Exporters in emerging economies and developing countries may therefore
use certification, or other legality verification instruments, to secure their access
to the Western market.
3 General introduction: role of the government in forest certification
schemes
A variety of literature has examined the development of forest certification,
including both the FSC and industry-dominated schemes in certain developed
countries, and finds that the government usually influences the certification
schemes at a distance, and does not participate directly in the schemes' regulatory
process.40 Gulbrandsen’s research provides an overview of the indirect ways that
the government influences forest certification, by breaking down the regulatory
process of certification into agenda setting and negotiation, implementation, and
monitoring/enforcement.
36 Brack 2005, p. 34.
37 EU Timber Regulation, Article 1.
38 EU Timber Regulation, Article 6.1(b).
39 Fishman & Obidzinski 2014, p. 9.
40 Overdevest 2010; Cadman 2011; Hysing 2009; Boström 2003.
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In the agenda-setting and negotiation stage, the government does not participate
directly in negotiations, but provides ‘expertise and technical advice, as well
administrative or financial support’.41 The government can also support the cer-
tification scheme through political statements, mediating negotiations, and
allowing a public company to join the negotiations.42 In addition to these ‘soft’
instruments, the government can also influence certification schemes through
public regulation: for example, by setting the regulatory framework to shape the
institutional background, such as establishing a fiscal system, property rights,
and a basic infrastructure.43 The government can also limit a certification scheme
by supporting a competing scheme or adopting rules to regulate it directly.44
The government can influence implementation by acting as a client of certifica-
tion regimes, by providing support to the clients, or by adopting favourable public
procurement policies.45 Sweden, for example, seeks certification in public for-
ests;46 the UK and the Netherlands have procurement policies that favour certi-
fied forest products.47
Though certification schemes usually rely on third parties to audit the perform-
ance, the government can support the process through the effective regulation of
public rules and regulations.48 Under both the FSC Principles49 and PEFC Sustain-
ability Benchmarks (the criteria to endorse national schemes),50 compliance with
the law and the protection of tenure rights and other social-economic rights are
important assessment criteria. The legal compliance and land tenure issues can-
not be solved by certification regimes alone, but rely on effective public enforce-
ment. The government can also rely on independent certifiers in monitoring the
compliance in certified area, and can prioritise its own inspections in other
areas.51
41 Gulbrandsen 2014, p. 76.
42 Hysing 2009, p. 319-322.
43 Hysing 2009, p. 315; Cashore, Auld & Newsom 2004, p. 20.
44 Gulbrandsen 2014, p. 76; Gale & Haward 2011; Vertinsky & Zhou 2000.
45 Gulbrandsen 2014, p. 76.
46 Hysing 2009, p. 320.
47 Oliver 2009, p. 37, 56.
48 Meidinger 2006; Gulbransen 2014, p. 76-77.
49 https:// ic. fsc. org/ preview. fsc -std -01 -001 -v4 -0 -fsc -principles -and -criteria -for -forest -stewardship. a
-516. pdf.
50 http:// pefc. org/ resources/ technical -documentation/ pefc -international -standards -2010/ 676 -
sustainable -forest -management -pefc -st -10032010.
51 Hysing 2009, p. 320.
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Adapted from Gulbrandsen 2014, p. 77
The above list of roles was derived from the literature by analysing both the FSC
scheme and industry-dominated schemes in developed countries. It shows that
governments can influence the certification schemes without participating
directly in their regulatory processes. Instead, governments can facilitate the
negotiation, uptake, and enforcement of certification, adopt rules to regulate the
activity of certification, or enforce public regulation. Such features fit well with
the FSC scheme. As for the FSC, one reason that governments do not interfere
directly in most aspects of the regulatory process is that the FSC was created in
opposition to intergovernmental forest policy processes; therefore the govern-
ment is not allowed to vote or to participate in the FSC's tripartite decision-mak-
ing body.52 The accreditation of certifiers for an FSC audit is conducted by
Accreditation Services International (ASI), an independent organisation.
As for industry-dominated schemes, the above indirect roles also apply. In addi-
tion, these schemes are also open to the direct participation of governments in
the regulatory processes. For example, standards developed under such schemes
often consider or incorporate the Sustainable Forest Management (SFM) Criteria
& Indicators (C&Is) developed by national states or intergovernmental pro-
cesses.53 Certifiers under these national schemes are usually accredited by
52 Gulbrandsen 2010, p. 54.
53 Cadman 2011, p. 118-119.
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national accreditation bodies.54 In short, governments of developed countries
only participate indirectly in the FSC scheme, while they can participate both
directly and indirectly in industry-dominated schemes.
Another difference between the role of governments of developed countries in
the FSC scheme and industry-dominated schemes pertains to the level of gover-
nance. The FSC is a global programme with its own governance structure and
global 'principles and criteria' for well managed forests. The FSC delegates author-
ity to national affiliates to tailor the global 'principles and criteria' to concrete
national or regional standards. Despite the differences in concrete standards, the
common governance structure makes the role of governments more or less com-
parable between countries. However, industry-dominated schemes are indepen-
dent national certification schemes, though many of them are linked through the
endorsement of a mutual recognition framework – the PEFC.
These national industry-dominated schemes have their own governance struc-
ture, with different degrees of openness to governmental participation. In addi-
tion, the different political and regulatory frameworks also influence the ability
and willingness of governments to participate in the regulatory processes of these
certification schemes. Therefore, country-based studies are needed to understand
how governments participate in the regulatory processes of the context based,
industry-dominated schemes. The following section summarises country studies
as regards how governments of developed countries have participated directly in
the regulatory processes of industry-dominated schemes. The roles of govern-
ments in industry-dominated schemes in emerging economies are examined in
Section 5.
4 Role of the government in industry-dominated schemes in developed
countries
In addition to the indirect roles discussed above, governments can also partici-
pate directly in the regulatory process of industry-dominated schemes. As shown
in the previous section, the role of the government in industry-dominated
schemes is context specific. The literature regarding such schemes in Sweden,
Canada, Australia, and the UK illustrates the different forms of government par-
ticipation.
In some countries, such as Sweden, the government has refrained from becoming
actively involved in certification schemes, with the exception of accrediting certi-
fiers for its industry-dominated scheme.55 An industry-dominated scheme started
to develop in Sweden after the forest owner associations withdrew from the FSC
negotiations, due to the demands of indigenous Sami representatives. The forest
owner associations, led by the industrial facilities association Sodra, negotiated
their own forest certification scheme, the Svenska, which was endorsed later by
the PEFC.56 The government did not join the negotiation nor does it have a seat
54 Gulbrandsen 2010, p. 62.
55 Hysing 2009, p. 319.
56 Gulbrandsen 2005.
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on the decision-making body. Instead, it provided consultation during negotia-
tions to ensure the compatibility of standards with national legislation.57
More active government participation is observed in Canada’s industry-domina-
ted CSA scheme. Shortly after establishment of the FSC, Canada began to develop
its national competitor, initiated by the industry. The government, however,
declared itself to be neutral with regard to the FSC scheme and the CSA regime,
and provided more support to the latter in its early days. It participated in the
stakeholder meetings to negotiate for the standards,58 and he national SFM C&Is
developed by the government was attached to the CSA standards. In the estab-
lished CSA scheme, a Technical Committee was composed to review and revise
the standards, and government regulators are members of the Technical Commit-
tee.59
In Canada, the negotiations on standards were led by the industry, and the gov-
ernment was only one of multiple stakeholders. The governments in Australia
and UK, however, initiated and coordinated the agenda setting process. The for-
mal process to negotiate forest certification only started in late 1990s, when the
Asian currency crisis triggered the shift of the market from Asia to Europe and
North America. The Department of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Forestry hosted a
stakeholder meeting in 1999, at which it was decided to establish a few commit-
tees to negotiate and draft a national scheme, the AFS. These standard-making
bodies mainly included government and industry representatives, with NGO rep-
resentatives being incorporated later into the drafting body. The government-
issued SFM C&Is provided the basis for the AFS standards, and the national
accreditation body JAS-ANZ accredits certifiers for the AFS scheme.
UK forest certification provides an exceptional example. Unlike the Svenska, the
CSA, or the AFS, which are complete certification schemes, including the stan-
dards, the auditing rules, and the dispute resolution procedure, the UKWAS in
the UK is simply a standard. The audit and enforcement relies on certifiers work-
ing in the UK, such as those accredited under the FSC and PEFC schemes.60 Ini-
tially, working groups for the FSC and a government- and industry-led certifica-
tion system developed in tandem. The strong environmental movements in the
UK allowed the NGOs to mobilise many retailers to commit to FSC products. To
secure access to the market, the government embarked on discussions with the
FSC to make the two schemes equivalent. They agreed to develop an audit proto-
col independently of the FSC but endorsed by it. This audit protocol, the UKWAS
standard, was negotiated under the coordination of the government, which man-
aged the negotiations, covered the costs, and hosted the discussions. A few gov-
ernment and intergovernmental forestry management standards/guidelines were
reflected in the UKWAS standard, which was published in 1999 and later recog-
57 Hysing 2009, p. 320.
58 Gale & Haward 2011, p. 184-193.
59 www. certificationcanada. org/ english/ programs_ used_ in_ canada/ csa -forest_ certification. phpSA
—Canadian Standards Association.
60 http:// ukwas. org. uk/ about -us/ purpose.
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nised by the FSC as its equivalent.61 The government also has a formal seat in the
UKWAS decision-making body.
The above analysis demonstrates that the government can participate in the regu-
latory process of forest certification schemes in various ways, ranging from join-
ing the negotiation as an equal party, initiating and coordinating the negotia-
tions, having a seat in the decision-making body of the certification scheme, and
accrediting the certifiers. With the exception of accreditation of the certifiers,
most of the roles are not based on the authoritative position of the state. The role
of private parties such as industry, third-party certifiers, and civil society is rela-
tively unlimited. They play an important part in the regulatory stages: negotiating
standards, conducting certification, managing the certification scheme, or moni-
toring enforcement of the scheme.
61 Gale & Haward 2011, p. 218-220.
Table 2 Role of the government in industry-dominated schemes in a few
developed countries




Sweden Does not join negotiations; only
provides consultancy
Accredits certifiers None
Canada National SFM C&Is developed by
the government are incorporated
into CSA standards
Participates in negotiations led by
the industry
A member of the of CSA scheme
standard-setting body
Accredits certifiers None
Australia Initiates, participates in, and coor-
dinates negotiations
Standards based on national SFM
C&Is developed by the govern-
ment
Accredits certifiers None
UK Negotiations with the FSC
Coordinating negotiation for
UKWAS
Seating on the decision-making
body
(Inter)governmental guidelines
reflected in the standards
None None
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5 Role of the government in forest governance schemes in emerging
economies
In this section, whether the government plays the same role in industry-domina-
ted certification schemes in developed and developing countries is explored. The
interaction between public and private authority becomes even more complex
with the emergence of the legality requirement.
It is necessary to examine in concrete contexts the role played by the government
in certification in emerging economies/developing countries, together with how
the balance relating to private and public authorities is influenced by a legality
verification regime. Brazil and Indonesia were chosen as examples to examine the
roles of government, as they are the largest tropical wood-producing countries,
and carry a high risk of illegal logging. Compared to other developing countries,
certification is better institutionalised there. In addition, they have substantial
export exposure on the EU, US and Australian market, and therefore are expected
to be influenced by the legality requirements. A third country, China, is added to
the discussion, because it is not only a major producer (208 million ha forest,
311 million forest revenue)62 but also a timber processor playing an important
role in the global value chain of forest products.63 Though its domestic timber
products are associated with low illegal risks, its imported products are regarded
to carry higher risks.64 The three countries selected provide examples of the dif-
ferent extents to which the institutionalisation of certification has been imple-
mented. They also demonstrate the divergent responses to the legality require-
ment: Indonesia has signed a VPA with the EU, where the legality verification
scheme is shaped by the VPA; China is considering developing its domestic legal-
ity verification scheme; and Brazil has adopted a more hostile attitude.
Discussion concerning the three countries follows a two-step process: firstly,
development of the certification scheme and the role of government are exam-
ined; secondly, the implication of the emerging legality requirement is described.
As in the developed countries, the role of the government in certification schemes
is analysed in the regulatory processes of such schemes. Indonesia has established
a verification scheme with a structure similar to certification schemes; hence, the
discussion also follows this approach. As is discussed later, Chinese’s legality
scheme is still under development, and Brazil relies on governmental inspection
and control rather than involving third parties in verifying the legality; the analy-
sis is not able to follow the same approach regarding certification. Therefore, this
section introduces briefly how government controls the issue of legality in Brazil,
and how verification of legality is developed in China.
62 http:// rainforests. mongabay. com/ deforestation/ 2000/ China. htm.
63 European Forest Institute 2011, p. 14-22.
64 www. globalwitness. org/ sites/ default/ files/ import/ a_ disharmonious_ trade_ pagtes_ 97_ 120. pdf.
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5.1 Brazil
Brazil responded quickly to the rising global certification regime, owing to con-
sumer demands and the threat of environmental boycotts from the North.65 An
FSC working group was established in 1997 to develop criteria tailored for the
Amazon. In response to that, certain industry groups started to develop their own
certification scheme, CERFLOR. The drafting process was led by a quasi-private
agency, the Brazilian Association of Technical Standards (ABNT),and the govern-
ment participated in the negotiation.66 The national legislation and international
conventions ratified by the Brazilian government, as well as the SFM C&Is cre-
ated by intergovernmental processes, provided the basis for the CERFLOR stan-
dard.67 This standard was launched officially by six ministries of the federal gov-
ernment in 2002,68 and is incorporated within the national standardization
framework.69 Regulators compose one of the four chambers of the standard-set-
ting bodies of the CERFLOR scheme.70
A governmental authority, the National Institute of Metrology, Standardisation,
and Industrial Quality (INMETRO), manages the certification system and accred-
its the certifiers.71 If there is a complaint against the assessment procedure, the
initial complaint needs to be made to the certification body. If it remains unre-
solved, the appeal can be passed on to INMETRO, and in the last instance to
CONMETRO.72
CERFLOR became operational in 2003, and was endorsed by the PEFC in
2005.Despite the large size of the areas, the coverage rates of both CERFLOR and
the FSC in Brazil are still low, especially for natural forests.73 In addition to the
usually quoted high costs involved, the government’s cautious attitude is also a
constraint for the spread of certification. On the one hand, the government
admits officially that 'voluntary certification is an important means to internalise
socio-environmental costs, but does not supplant national regulation'.74 On the
other hand, few efforts were made at the federal level to increase the demand for
certified products. However, a few states did move beyond the federal level. For
example, Sao Paulo has a procurement policy promoting the purchase or use of
certified wood.75 The government of Acre offers technical and monetary support
to certified community-based forestry companies.76 Local regulators sometimes
imposed additional scrutiny on those who had adopted certification, for fear that
65 May 2005, p. 8.
66 Araujo 2008, p. 20-21.
67 www. globalwitness. org/ sites/ default/ files/ import/ a_ disharmonious_ trade_ pagtes_ 97_ 120. pdf.
68 Orzinga 2004, p. 62.
69 www. pefc. org/ component/ pefcnationalmembers/ ?view= pefcnationalmembers& Itemid= 48/ 31 -
Brazil.
70 Ozinga 2004, p. 63.
71 May 2005, p. 13-14; Ozinga 2004, p. 62.
72 Ozinga 2004, p. 64.
73 www. florestal. gov. br/ snif/ producao -florestal/ certificacao -florestal.
74 May 2005, p. 4.
75 Espach 2006, p. 75.
76 Humphries & Kainer 2006, p. 41.
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they obfuscated their extract from other uncertified areas.77 Some local regula-
tors even withheld harvesting licences from FSC-certified forest owners, viewing
FSC standards and audits as infringements on their authority.78
When the FLEGT Action Plan was initiated, and many exporting countries started
to negotiate a VPA with the EU, Brazil showed little interest in it. The govern-
ment argues that the primary threat to Brazil forests is land conversion rather
than illegal logging itself. Some other measures, such as supply-side control are
regarded as a more appropriate approach than demand-side instruments by the
government. Moreover, Brazil has long been resistant to the 'internationalisation'
of the Amazon, and is concerned about maintaining sovereign control. Social and
environmental movements are often regarded as agents of an international lobby,
and therefore are treated cautiously by the government.79 As a result, Brazil
favours a government-led legality-control system, with command and control
instruments and enforcement mechanisms80 rather than a third-party audited
verification system. The government-led control system is based on planning and
permits for land use or for land use change and harvests. Timber-related transac-
tions and transportation are tracked by the Declaration of Origin System (DOF),
with verification and monitoring is carried out by environmental agencies.81 The
centralised ports for export trade are also amenable to national controls.82
In summary, the Brazilian government plays a role similar to that of developed
countries in the agenda-setting stage by participating in negotiations, making
public statements to support the certification scheme, and developing the SFM
C&Is, which are later incorporated into the certification standards. A more active
role is observed in the implementation and enforcement stages. The government
not only accredits the certifiers, adopts procurement policies, and provides assis-
tance to the certified community-based forest companies (in some states), but
also manages the scheme directly and is involved in the dispute resolution proce-
dure. As for the legality regime, the Brazilian government prefers to rely on public
regulation to ensure the legality of their products, rather than establishing a spe-
cific third-party verified system.
77 May 2005, p. 13-14.
78 Espach 2006, p. 78.
79 Singer 2008, p. 527.
80 Bueno & Cashore 2013, p. 4.
81 Thiel 2008, p. 119-121.
82 Brown et al. 2008, p. 56.
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Table 3 Role of the government in the industry-dominated certification
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Indonesia’s interest in forest certification started in the early 1990s, and two vol-
untary schemes became operational in 1999: the FSC and a national certification
scheme, the Indonesian Eco-label Institute (LEI) scheme. The international con-
ferences, and boycotts initiated by international NGOs, pushed Indonesia to
develop such schemes. The Ministry of Forestry (MoF) played an important role
in driving the LEI scheme.83 The Minister of Forestry announced that he had
asked the former Minister of the Environment, Emil Salim, to establish a national
certification scheme at the end of 1993. Emil Salim established the LEI working
group to negotiate the standards, involving a variety of stakeholders, such as the
government, academia, NGOs, and the private sector.84 The standards were
drawn from international and national documents, such as FSC C&Is, ISO 14000
standards, ITTO C&Is, and Indonesian national C&Is, and were later approved by
the government (the Indonesian National Standards Body).85
The LEI institute was officially established as a foundation in 1998, and later
became the accreditation body, which accredited its own certifiers.86 The LEI was
transformed into a constituent-based organisation in 2009, with its four-chamber
membership. The government, however, is not a member of the LEI and cannot
directly govern the institution.87 The penetration rates of both the FSC and LEI
are still slow. By the end of 2013, 21 units covering 1.52 million hectares of forest
83 Muhtaman & Prasetyo 2006, p. 42.
84 Tacconi 2007, p. 265.
85 Muhtaman & Prasetyo 2006, p. 43-46.
86 Tacconi 2007, p. 265.
87 www. lei. or. id/ anggota -lei.
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held certification from the FSC;88 LEI certification covers 1.89million hectare for-
ests.89
A mandatory certification scheme was introduced in the early 2000s, under which
independent auditors (LP) assess the performance of the industries according to
sustainable forest management standards, issued via a few decrees in 2002 and
2003.90 These independent auditors need to be accredited by the MoF. An Evalua-
tion Team was established under the MoF to assess the LP’s audit reports. The
MoF covers the costs of audits in the first three years, and companies are respon-
sible for the costs afterwards.91 A dispute resolution mechanism, the Verification
Advisory Council, was set up, appointed by the MoF. However, since its
establishment the Council has rarely met.92 Although this certification scheme is
mandatory, only 62 forest concessions had been certified up until March 2013,
composing only 35% of the total number of forest concessions.93 This certifica-
tion system is also criticised as lacking independence and transparency, or being
paper-based, with few meaningful changes.94
To promote the adoption of certification, the MoF adopted a policy to alleviate
the administrative burden for certified companies, such as exempting them from
reductions in annual allowable cut, allowing them to self-prove their annual work
plan,95 and freeing them from field inspections. In practice, however, many com-
panies that obtained certification complained that inspections from local forest
agencies remained in force, resulting in unexpected costs. This was because after
decentralisation in the late 1990s, the MoF no longer had authority to control
local forest agencies, and these could still conduct field inspections of certified
forests.96
The effort to introduce certification yielded limited results, with only a small
amount of interest in certification. However, Indonesia still faced strong pressure
from consumer countries and civil society campaigns to tackle its rampant illegal
logging.97 Hence, the government adopted a stepwise approach by introducing a
legality requirement. A multi-stakeholder dialogue was established to negotiate
the legality standard, led successively by the Alliance to Promote Certification and
Combat Illegal Logging (established by the Nature Conservancy and the WWF)
and LEI. The standard was submitted to the MoF for approval in late 2007, and
was signed into law in 2009.98 This 2009 regulation combines the existing man-
datory certification scheme – based on sustainable management standards – with
88 www. tff -indonesia. org/ index. php/ programs/ certification -support/ list -of -fsc -certified -forest.
89 www. lei. or. id/ iges -study -on -forest -certification.
90 Wells 2008, p. 179.
91 Wells 2008, p. 180.
92 Wells 2008, p. 177-180.
93 Wijaya, Rosyidie & Onimaru 2014, p. 656.
94 Wells 2008, p. 181.
95 Tacconi, Obidzinski & Agung 2004, p. 14.
96 Wijaya, Rosyidie & Onimaru 2014, p. 662.
97 Tacconi 2007; Wells 2008, p. 175-176.
98 Cashore & Stone 2014, p. 53.
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a new Timber Legality Assurance System (TLAS) – based on the negotiated legal-
ity standards.99
Another approach taken by Indonesia to combat illegal logging was to discuss the
VPA with the EU. Negotiations began in 2007, the agreement was concluded in
2011,100 and the legality standard and the SFM standard defined under the 2009
regulation were incorporated into the VPA.101 Under the new system, forest oper-
ators can apply for both mandatory certification and legality verification. The
assessment is conducted by third party certifiers/verifiers, who are regulated by
the MoF.102 More transparency has been introduced into the system, with inde-
pendent monitoring institutions such as civil society and NGOs being encouraged
to monitor the process of accreditation and auditing. They can raise objections
regarding the legality verification, and can file complaints with the National
Accreditation Body.103
Another voluntary forest certification scheme, the Indonesian Forestry Certifica-
tion Cooperation (IFCC), was established in 2011. The IFCC published its SFM
standard and Chain of Custody standard, which were endorsed by the PEFC in
October 2014. The Standardisation Committee, the IFCC standard-setting body,
is composed of business, NGOs, local communities, the scientific community,
governmental authorities, and so on.104 The IFCC relies on the national accredita-
tion body to accredit certifiers.105
In summary, Indonesia presents a more complicated picture with respect to cer-
tification, including both voluntary schemes, such as the FSC, LEI, and the IFCC,
and a mandatory scheme. The role of the government in such schemes also varies
significantly. The government participated in and coordinated discussions con-
cerning LEI standards, but has neither a seat in its governing body nor any
authority to accredit certifiers. The latter two roles are observed in the IFCC
scheme. The mandatory scheme, however, is led by the government, both in
terms of standard setting and accrediting. The government also manages the
mandatory scheme, evaluates the auditing of certifiers, and resolves disputes.
Third parties are involved only to a limited extent to conduct on-the-ground
assessment. More room for stakeholders and the public was allowed after the
mandatory scheme had been combined with the legality verification scheme and
incorporated into the VPA. A legality verification scheme was also established in
accordance with the VPA. The government plays a leading role in the legality veri-
fication scheme, both in terms of system management and setting standards,
while third-party verifiers are used to conduct the audit, and the public is encour-
aged to monitor the process.
99 Wijaya, Rosyidie & Onimaru 2014.
100 Voluntary Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Indonesia
on Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade in Timber Products to the European Union,
Official Journal of the European Union, L 150/252, L150/299 (2014).
101 VPA, Annex 5.
102 VPA, Annex 5, section 4.1; 4.2.
103 VPA, Annex 5, 4.1.
104 Form International 2014, p. 19.
105 Form International 2014, p. 146.
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5.3 China
Two certification schemes are now operating in China: the Working Group for the
FSC Chinese Standards and the China Forest Certification Scheme (CFCC). The
FSC issued its first certification in China in 1999, and the Working Group was
established in 2007. In the early stage, the FSC received cautious support from
the government,106 but the initiation and development of the CFCC was led
106 Bartley 2014, p. 102-103.
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strongly by the government. The process started in 2001, when a forest certifica-
tion branch and a leading group were established under the State Forest Agency
to prepare a national certification scheme.107 A few governmental rules were sub-
sequently adopted, in preparation for the structure regarding forest certification,
and some government-guided pilot procedures were conducted in a few provin-
ces.108 The standards were launched formally by the State Forest Agency in 2007,
and two years later legislation was published to set the rules for the procedure of
certification.
The China Forest Certification Council (CFCC) was established in 2010, as the
governing body of the China Forest Certification Scheme. The CFCC claims to be a
multi-stakeholder process, but its Secretariat is established under a public institu-
tion affiliated with the government.109 The CFCC is responsible for drafting stan-
dards and operating the scheme (the Charter of the CFCC, Article 3), but its activ-
ities are regulated by the Certification and Accreditation Administration (the
CNCA, a public authority).110 The CFCC is responsible for resolving disputes con-
cerning the auditing of certifiers. Any complaints against the CFCC are made to
the CNCA.
According to Chinese law, certifiers working in China need to obtain permission
from the CNCA. An agency established under the CNCA – the China National
Accreditation Service for Conformity Assessments (CNAS) – acts as the accredita-
tion body for certifiers. The requirement to obtain approval is regarded as de facto
restriction, since CNCA has no clear procedures for approving forestry certifi-
ers.111 Failure to receive approval from the CNCA means that certifiers run the
risk of being treated as illegal and having to face hefty fines. Currently, the only
institution approved by the CNCA to conduct forest certification is Zhonglin
Tianhe, a Chinese-based certification body. Though it is not affiliated with the
government, many question its independence, owing to its close government
ties.112
The China Forest Certification Scheme, endorsed by the PEFC in 2014, has a
meta-standard, and is open to endorse national certification schemes. The SFA
has asked the FSC repeatedly to recognise the CFCC. However, the FSC operates
its own standard, and is not open to mutual recognition.113 To date, no foreign
certifiers who are responsible for conducting FSC certification have been
approved by the CNAS in China. The only approved certification body in China,
Zhonglin Tianhe, has not been accredited by the organisation required by the FSC.
Therefore, FSC certification runs a high risk of legal uncertainty in China.114
107 Zhao et al. 2011, p. 1087.
108 Zhao et al. 2011, p. 1087-1088.
109 The Charter of the CFCC, Article 4, available at: www. cfcs. org. cn/ zh/ defined -view/ 8. action ?
menuid= 613 (in Chinese).
110 The Temporary Implementation Rules for Forest Certification in China, Issued by the CNCA
2009.
111 Bartley 2014, p. 103.
112 Buckingham & Jepson 2013, p. 291.
113 Buckingham & Jepson 2013, p. 287.
114 Barley 2014.
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The certification schemes in developed countries, including the PEFC schemes,
are usually under scrutiny by eNGOs (environmental non-governmental organisa-
tions). This may not, however, be replicated in China due to the government’s
control of eNGOs.115 In China, eNGOs are confronted with strict legal and admin-
istrative barriers, making their legitimacy a serious concern. Only a few of them
are registered with the government and are considered legal, many of which are
government-organised NGOs. eNGOs in China usually take non-confrontational
measures,116 and tend not to challenge the government-led certification scheme.
This also explains why China can push forward a national forest certification
scheme quickly, without engaging in a long deliberative bargaining process
involving various stakeholders.
A green procurement policy has been developing since 2006, when the Ministry
of Finance and Former State Environmental Protection Agency (now Ministry of
Environmental Protection) issued a normative document that required govern-
mental procurement to give priority to products with an environmental label.
Each year, these two ministries publish a list of such products.117 With the
development of forest certification schemes in China, the government is also con-
sidering including forest certification in its procurement policy.118 Of the certi-
fied forest operators under the CFCC, many are local forestry agencies (public
authorities), and manage the state forests.119
The initial response to the mounting legality requirement in China was one of
skepticism, with forest industry regarding it as a non-tariff trade barrier, and the
government viewed it as an infringement on national sovereignty. Acceptance
was triggered only after the industry and the government were assured that the
legality requirement would not be used to change domestic policies.120 A few
bilateral coordination programmes have been launched to address illegal logging
and trade issues, and a national timber legality verification system is under
development by the State Forest Agency.121 The legality regime is especially inter-
esting, because China is not only an exporting country that needs to satisfy the
legality requirement of developed importing countries, but also a country with
substantial imports of timber products that carry with them high risks involving
illegality. Research shows that if China and other major importing countries, such
as New Zealand and East Asia, are also engaged in the import ban of illegal forest
products, the global illegal logging activities will be substantially reduced.122
Though the concrete structure of the legality regime in China is still in its infancy,
scholars predict it will become similar to the EU regime, but with a more lenient
legality requirement. Instead of calling for exporting countries to set up a specific
115 Buckingham & Jepson 2013, p. 292.
116 Faure & Jing 2014, p. 255-258.
117 www. mep. gov. cn/ ztbd/ rdzl/ bzcpcgqd/ .
118 Buckingham & Jepson 2013, p. 287.
119 www. cfcs. org. cn/ zh/ findcompany. action.
120 Cashore & Stone 2014, p. 55, 59.
121 Cashore & Stone 2014, p. 54; Huang, Wilkes, Sun & Terheggen2013, p. 350; European Forest
Institute 2011, p. 37.
122 Gan, Cashore & Stone 2013.
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LV system, it may endorse the timber products labeled under the legality or cer-
tification standards of those countries, such as the legality licenses under VPAs,
the FSC, or other forest-related certificates.123
In summary, strong government involvement can also be observed in the CFCC
scheme in China. The standards were drafted as a governmental process, and
were launched officially by the government. A separate organisation, the CFCC,
was established to operate the scheme, which is regulated by the government.
And through its authority to approve the certifiers, the government exerts a
strong influence in favouring one scheme (CFCC) over another (FSC). There is
also limited room for eNGOs to monitor the operation of certification schemes in
China, due to the government’s control of eNGOs. The legality regime is still
under development, and the process is being led by the government.
5.4 Summary
The above analysis demonstrates clearly that governments can play various roles
in industry-dominated schemes in emerging economies. Roles such as those in
developed countries are observed in the LEI and IFCC schemes, where the govern-
ment participates in/coordinates the negotiations or accredits the certifiers. The
government plays a more active role in other schemes, such as CERFLOR, the
mandatory certification scheme in Indonesia, and the CFCC, by deciding stan-
dards through legislation, by having government authorities manage the scheme,
and by limiting the FSC scheme through strict control of the certifiers.
The role of the government in forest governance may be strengthened further via
the legality regimes. Indonesia established its TLAS scheme through the VPA with
the EU. Under this plan of action, standards of legality are determined according
123 Huang et al. 2013, p. 350; Sun & Canby 2011, p. 37.
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to the VPA. The government manages the system, regulates third-party verifiers,
and resolves disputes. In China, a national LV scheme is still under development,
led by the government. The government in Brazil is more resistant to the legality
regime, and prefers to control the issue of legality through its own public regula-
tory system.
6 Conclusion
Transnational forest governance schemes began to develop in the 1990s when
governmental regulation failed to result in a satisfactory level of success. The new
institutional background triggered the emergence of forest certification schemes,
often led by NGOs or industrial organisations rather than by the government.
Such schemes have gained wide support in developed countries, but their rate of
penetration in emerging economies and developing countries is still low. A step-
wise approach is now emerging, introducing attainable standards of legality
instead of high standards of sustainability. The emerging legality regimes may
place governments back at the centre of forest governance.
Though certification schemes were developed initially by actors in the private sec-
tor in response to the failure of public regulation, they are often intertwined with
state control. The government can play various roles in all three regulatory pro-
cesses involving certification schemes. In both the FSC and industry-dominated
schemes, the government can adopt measures to shape the institutional back-
ground, promote the spread of certification and regulate its operation, without
participating directly in the regulatory process. Industry-dominated schemes are
more open to direct government participation than is the FSC scheme. Since
industry-dominated schemes are context based, studies were conducted to exam-
ine the roles of governments in four developed countries and in three emerging
economies, respectively. In developed countries, the government is seen to partic-
ipate in the regulatory process, though usually not as an authoritative party, and
room for private actors in such schemes is relatively unconstrained. Governments
can play a similar role in some industry-dominated schemes in emerging econo-
mies, such as LEI and the IFCC in Indonesia. In other cases, governments can play
a very active role, such as deciding standards, managing the system, and resolving
disputes. The room for private actors is more limited in these instances. CER-
FLOR in Brazil, the mandatory scheme in Indonesia, and the CFCC in China pro-
vide such examples.
The increasing legality requirement from some developed countries may influ-
ence further the relationship between private and public authority in forest gov-
ernance. The case studies of the three emerging economies described above high-
light a strong government involvement in their legality regimes. In other words,
the advancing legality regime is beginning to put the state, especially in the
emerging economies and developing countries, squarely back at the centre of
global forest governance. China may well exemplify this new stage of forest gover-
nance, because not only does it export to countries demanding legal verification,
it also imports from countries where the risk of illegal logging is high. The ques-
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tion of how such a new stage of global forest governance will function, and
whether it will achieve a more effective outcome, offers an exciting direction for
future research.
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